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ABSTRACT
Cyber security researchers are starting to experiment with fear
appeals, with a wide variety of designs and reported efficaciousness.
This makes it hard to derive recommendations for designing and
deploying these interventions. We thus reviewed the wider fear
appeal literature to arrive at a set of guidelines to assist cyber
security researchers. Our review revealed a degree of dissent about
whether or not fear appeals are indeed helpful and advisable. Our
review also revealed a wide range of fear appeal experimental
designs, in both cyber and other domains, which confirms the need
for some standardized guidelines to inform practice in this respect.
We propose a protocol for carrying out fear appeal experiments,
and we review a sample of cyber security fear appeal studies, via
this lens, to provide a snapshot of the current state of play. We hope
the proposed experimental protocol will prove helpful to those who
wish to engage in future cyber security fear appeal research.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Social aspects of security and pri-
vacy; Usability in security and privacy; • Applied computing→
Psychology; Sociology.
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1 INTRODUCTION
1This is your computer
This is your computer if it gets hacked
You should take precautions
Any questions?
The citizen of the 21st century has probably been subjected to
this kind of message, in essence a cyber security “fear appeal”.
These messages attempt to scare people into taking a particular
recommended action to secure their information and devices.
1Inspired by [178]
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The rationale for the use of fear appeals is first, that if you can
make people care about something, they are more likely to take the
recommended action, and second, that eliciting the fear emotion,
by highlighting unpleasant consequences, is likely to make them
care.
Why not just tell people what to do? The problem is that knowl-
edge does not reliably convert to behavior [98, 113]. Hence eliciting
emotion to prompt action seems worth considering [102, 180], and
fear is a powerful emotion.
Fear appeals have been used for decades [23, 58, 61, 133, 159],
if not centuries [143]. Proponents of the use of fear appeals [12,
159, 165], consider them efficacious in persuading people to change
their behaviors. Others consider the deployment of fear appeals
misguided, arguing that the belief in their efficacy to be based on
intuition and weak evidence [2, 19, 86, 88, 90, 94].
In cyber security, too, some advocate the use of fear appeals [82,
83, 169] while others consider them counter-productive [95, 109].
Over the past decade, voices have been raised to warn against the
use of fear in behavioral interventions [19, 102, 127].
The fact that there is dissent in this domain means that we should
not unthinkingly reach for a fear appeal when we are confronted
with an ill-advised or absent cyber security behavior. It is important
for the deployers of cyber security fear appeals aimed at the gen-
eral public to base their practices on solid empirical and scientific
evidence. Otherwise we risk doing more harm than good.
Consider, for example, the “Scared Straight” program [49]. The
idea was that adolescents with behavioral problems would be taken
to a jail to meet with inmates, who would “scare” them into aban-
doning their wayward ways. A movie with that name appeared
in 1978, popularizing the scheme. Subsequent studies have now
discovered that not only does this program not deliver its promised
outcomes, but that it actually has harmful effects [135].
Another example is the “baby doll” scheme, which attempts to
put adolescents off teenage pregnancies by making them aware of
how hard it is to take care of a new baby. The scheme attempts to
make the long-term consequences of a momentary decision more
salient. Initial evaluations were positive [131] but a subsequent
evaluation, in 2016, found that the program did not achieve what it
was meant to achieve. In fact, those who participated were more
likely to have a teenage pregnancy [112]. These examples serve
to demonstrate that strong emotions, while intuitively seeming
powerful motivators for behavioral change, can lead to unintended
outcomes, and actually backfire.
Some domains report efficaciousness of fear appeals: e.g., health
[181] and beauty & personal care [11]. Others report failures: e.g.,
climate change [48], reckless & drunk driving [101, 110] andHIV/AIDS
[45, 120]. We do not know whether cyber security is sufficiently
similar to any of these such that we could predict the extent to
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which cyber security fear appeals would be likely to succeed, or
fail. We need to carry out more well-designed cyber security fear
appeal studies before we will be able to draw a conclusion either
about the cyber domain as a whole, or particular behaviors within
the cyber domain.
It would be beneficial for cyber security fear appeal researchers
to have guidelines to inform their studies. In formulating these, we
can benefit from the extensive literature on fear appeals in other
more mature domains.
We first present an overview of the wider literature on fear
appeals (Sections 2 and 3). Section 4 then proposes a model for
fear appeal experiments and reviews a range of cyber security fear
appeal studies through that lens. Section 5 brings all our insights
together to conclude the paper.
2 FEAR APPEALS: STATE OF PLAY
Fear is essentially an emotion, and emotions, both positive and
negative, act on humans as follows [38]: emotions arise from the
individual’s assessment of a situation, have a biological basis, are
informed by learning, and unfold over time, while individuals con-
tinuously attempt to regulate their emotions.
Fear is invoked when a threat exhibits characteristics as shown
in Table 1 (left column). Hence fear appeals, as we see in the next
section, often include matching components (right column).
Fear Characteristic Appeal Content
important significance and personal rele-
vance
negatively valenced severity
impending susceptibility
requiring effort to engage with response efficacy
it is possible to mitigate action and self efficacy in carrying
it out
Table 1: Characteristics of Fear (left) [38, 130, 178] and the
Matching Fear Appeal Communication Intent (right)
Dillard [38] explains that the idea of adding fear to appeals is
grounded in the belief that persuasion will follow induced fright;
that fear will propel people to take protective action [54]. The
target then, according to the theory, will seek to reduce the feelings
invoked by the appeal. A specific action is recommended to give
them a way to achieve this.
2.1 Fear Appeal Components
Table 1’s right hand column suggests what the core components
of fear appeals should be, and these components are confirmed by
the literature on fear appeals. The components are ordered here as
recommended by [39, 97].
A: Details about the importance of the threat (induce the fear
[97]):
(1) A statement of the cause of the threat, emphasizing personal
susceptibility [165].
(2) A statement about the consequence of the threat, emphasizing
the severity [37, 150, 165].
A fear appeal can provide implicit or explicit threat information
[181]. For example, an implicit appeal could show a picture of a
hacker crouched behind a computer screen, and the recipient has
to figure out what the hacker is doing. Explicit information shows
a hacker taking over webcams and watching people in their living
rooms. Implicit appeals are open to misinterpretation.
B: A statement related to response efficacy (action can be taken
to mitigate the threat [39, 102, 168]). Lewis et al. [102] highlight the
importance of focusing the response efficacy part of the message
on the individual’s role in dealing with the threat.
C: Feasible recommended actions (how to assuage the fear)
[95, 97, 178].
D: A statement related to self efficacy (the individual is able
to take the action [10, 32, 39, 46, 61, 62, 133]). This is important
because fear, combined with high efficacy, produces the greatest
behavioral change, whereas messages conveying low efficacy are
likely to trigger maladaptive coping responses such as avoidance
or reactance [133, 180]. Dillard et al. conclude that “when actions
are seen as desirable, people perform those actions if they are able”
[38, p.1012] (emphasis ours).
2.2 Recommended Action Dimensions
There are three dimensions to the kinds of actions that are rec-
ommended during the fear appeal (cyber security examples are
provided in Table 2).
The first is whether it is a one-off or a repeated action [165]. A po-
lio vaccination is an example of the former, and breast examination
an example of the latter.
The second dimension is related to the nature of the activity
itself [2]: omission (do not do this), commission (do this) or inhibit
(beware). Commission activities can be preventative, corrective or
detective.
The third and final dimension is suggested by Insko et al. [77],
who make a distinction between initiating a new behavior and
changing an existing behavior.
Frequency
One-Off Repeated
A
ct
io
n
Ty
pe
Don’t Use a Specific
Privacy-Invasive
Smartphone App
Use Public WiFi
Do Install a Password
Manager
Use a VPN
Beware Disposing of Used Storage
Media
Email Links and
Attachments
Table 2: Cyber Security Recommended Action Dimensions
and Cyber Examples
2.3 Interactions
The fear appeal components are not independent. Firstly, perceived
efficacy (combined response and self efficacy) has to be higher than
the perceived threat. If people do not feel that the actions they can
take will ameliorate the threat, they are likely to choose not to
act [181]. Self efficacy also interacts with response efficacy and
susceptibility [106]. Two of these need to be high to prompt action.
If only one is high, people are likely to engage in maladaptive
responses. Moreover, Popova [137] argues that the relationship
between severity and susceptibility is multiplicative, i.e., if either is
considered unimportant, there is no motivation to act.
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2.4 Fear Appeals & Behavior Change
Tengland [166] cites Rosenberg [151], who proposes a teleological
scientific model of individual behavioral choices. These are depicted
in the steps in Figure 1.
Tengland [166] explains that most behavioral change interven-
tions, as enumerated by Buchanan [21], focus on one or more of
these “steps”. Security awareness drives focus on (1) and (4), and
fear appeals, or what Tengland calls, “Scare Campaigns”, attempt
to manipulate wants (1 and 4) and provide information about rec-
ommended actions (2 and 3). Some will augment messages with
information about response efficacy (2 and 3) [39] and self efficacy
(5 and 6) [165]. Very few fear appeal behavioral change models
acknowledge the notion of opportunity (7).
X	wants	to	achieve	Y	
X	believes	that	doing	Z	will	achieve	Y	
X	believes	that	nothing	else	will	achieve	Y	
X	has	no	other	wants	that	override	Y	
X	knows	how	to	do	Z	
X	is	able	to	do	Z	
X	has	the	opportunity		to	do	Z	
X	does	Z,	and	achieves	Y	
1	
2	
3	
4	
5	
6	
7	
Recommended	
Action	&	
Response		
Efficacy	
Self		
Efficacy	
Want	
Want	
Figure 1: Progression to Taking Recommended Action.
X=Person, Y=Secured Device, Z might be Encryption in the
Cyber context
Deterrence is different from fear appeals. Fear appeals seek to
draw people up the staircase firstly by exciting the fear emotion
to propel them, and then scaffolding their progress by providing
2, 3, 5 & 6. Deterrence, on the other hand, occurs when people are
dissuaded from wanting to achieve the action, or when they are
not convinced of the existence or efficacy of 2-7.
2.5 A Selective Review of Fear Appeal
Behavioral Change Models
One of the first theories to explain responses to fear appeals is Fear
as Drive [74]. The rationale behind this theory is that fear induces
a feeling of unpleasantness, which the recipient will act to resolve
or reduce [38, 78, 114, 117].
This theory was criticized by Leventhal [97], who argued firstly
that the model assumes that fear is a mediator of acceptance of
the message. The drive theory also treats fear as a unitary concept,
whereas Leventhal argues that fear is more nuanced than this. Lev-
enthal also says that this model is somewhat simplistic, because it
suggests that the severity of the threat and the resulting intensity of
the fear is more likely to persuade people to take preventive action.
Yet some people undeniably respond to fear appeals by avoiding
the issue or denying the threat.
The next model is the Parallel Response Model, which does not re-
quire emotional arousal as a necessary pre-condition to preventive
or adaptive behavior. This model considers fear appeals to trigger
two independent processes: fear control and danger control [97],
the second of which is a problem solving process [38]. In this model,
fear and danger control processes may interact but are essentially
independent. If the person seeks purely to control the fear, they
might do this by avoidance or denial, and this might well deter
danger control processes (preventive actions) from being activated
— the fact that all the cognitive processes are involved in fear control
essentially lead to persuasion resistance.
Rogers [148] proposed ProtectionMotivation Theory (PMT), which
focuses primarily on the danger control branch of the parallel re-
sponse model. This model has four components: (1) perceived vul-
nerability, (2) perceived severity, (3) response efficacy and (4) self
efficacy. The first two constitute the threat appraisal and the sec-
ond two the coping appraisal. Dillard [38] argues that this model
cognitivizes passion into protection motivation.
Witte [178] proposed the Extended Parallel Process Model (EPPM)
to address three perceived issues with the field of fear appeal re-
search. In particular: (1) the conflating of threat and fear, (2) a focus
on message acceptance and neglect, with no in-depth focus on why
such messages fail, (3) that the role of threat and self efficacy are
recognized as important, but the means by which they exert their
influence is not well understood. This model builds on the fear-
as-drive [78], protection motivation [148] and parallel response
models [97]. In essence, Witte thereby proposes putting fear back
into fear appeals.
This model suggests that fear appeals trigger two kinds of ap-
praisal, the first being an appraisal of the threat. This appraisal will
decide whether the threat is moderate or high, and fear may result.
The second appraisal is an assessment of the efficacy of a response.
If the assessment of both are high, a danger control process will be
initiated, and the recipient is likely to take the recommended action.
The fear control process is initiated when the message recipient
believes that it is not possible to mitigate the threat, and, in this
case, the fear emotion might trigger a maladaptive response.
3 UNRESOLVED ISSUES
Fear has been used in a number of areas to influence human behav-
ior, either to persuade people to cease or reduce particular negative
behaviors, or initiate beneficial behaviors [12, 159, 165].
Yet there are those who believe that fear appeals are contra-
indicated [19, 86, 88, 90, 94]. Kok et al. [88] refer to “the false belief”
in fear appeals in his denunciation, concluding that risk perception
is not a reliable determinant of behavior. French et al. [53] report
that their analysis of systematic reviews of fear appeals revealed
very little evidence that risk information impacted health behaviors.
Peters et al. [134] call fear “a bad counselor”. Here, we explore
specific differences of opinion.
3.1 Viability & Advisability
3.1.1 Fear as Motivator. It has been argued that the inclusion of
fear in an appeal will improve the persuasiveness of messages [41,
165], increase engagement [141], enhance information processing
[119] and render the message memorable [16].
Ruiter et al. [152], on the other hand, report that although fear
does indeed impact attitude and intention, this does not necessarily
convert into actual behavior. They argue that fear could arouse
defensive reactions [171] (evidenced by [105]) and bias in informa-
tion processing, which could result in ineffective or no behavioral
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change. Indeed, researchers warn that fear levels are inversely asso-
ciated with persuasiveness [24, 160].
Floyd et al. [50] conclude, from their meta-analysis of fear ap-
peals, that perceived self-efficacy is far more influential than fear.
This is confirmed by [118, 129]. O’Neill and Nicholson-Cole [127]
argue that fear appeals actually do not have much potential for en-
couraging genuine engagement, in their case with climate change
communications.
Yzer et al. [183] point out the difficulty of pinning down the actual
role of the fear part of fear appeals. They cite Earl and Albarracín
[45] to point out that studies have not yet provided compelling
evidence for a link between fear appeal construction and message
acceptance.
3.1.2 How Fear is Processed. There is evidence that indicates that
phishing messages work because they elicit fear, and this makes
people likely to act without deliberation [173]. This suggests that
phishing messages that induce fear cause the usual cognitive pro-
cessing to be bypassed. Given that this is so, can we expect a well-
intended fear appeal to be processed cognitively and thoughtfully?
Some authors argue that when perceived efficacy is high, the fear
appeal is more likely to be cognitively processed [133, 137]. Does
this mean that those with high self efficacy effectively experience a
lower level of fear because they know how to cope with the threat?
If people do experience real fear, would they perhaps carry out
the recommended action in the heat of the moment to assuage the
emotion, and then abandon it once the fear has worn off? The unan-
swered and important question is whether fear is indeed effective
in motivating long-term adoption of advised behaviors.
3.1.3 Cues and Rewards. Because many cyber security behaviors
need to be repeated, it would be beneficial if these behaviors became
habitual. Duhigg [42] explains that habits are cued by something
in the environment, and that the person gains some kind of reward
from carrying out the behavior. Consider the fear appeal — if this is
used, is the idea to elicit fear as a cue every time the behavior needs
to be carried out? Moreover, what is the reward? Is it assuaged fear?
This is surely unsustainable and undesirable.
3.1.4 Ethics. Fear appeals might be considered to violate auton-
omy [166], restrict choice [116], cause psychological harm [63, 76],
demonize those who behave insecurely [182] or have negative im-
pacts on long-term security behaviors.
Negative emotions can have long-term health consequences [29],
and the cumulative effect of appeals across the spectrum of domains
is likely to be significant. The question is whether fear appeals are
warranted to address the full range of insecure behaviors. Moreover,
if we do demonstrate the efficacy of fear appeals, they may start to
be used extensively, and the cumulative and potentially negative
impact is likely to become even more significant.
Demonization is another consideration in the use of fear appeals.
By targeting specific groups believed to need the change in the
behavior the most, it may result in causing them harm through
this demonization. For example, as the AIDS crisis began to unfold,
gay individuals were targeted with specific messaging via fear
appeals to help prevent the spread of HIV. However, this also led
to the reinforcement of negative stereotypes and the demonization
of gay people as a group [182]. Beyond the demonization of the
target group, a fear appeal aimed at a specific group may result
in complacency in those not targeted [64]. They may believe that
since they were not mentioned specifically, they are not at risk.
Indeed, one of the very first papers in the human-centered security
research fieldmakes this very argument [1], that people who behave
insecurely are blamed for this, instead of organizations considering
that their demands are unreasonable.
Albarracín et al. [2] argue that even if fear appeals do not work,
they will not do harm. The two examples that we mentioned in the
introduction appear to contradict this, as do [96, 140]. Yet there is a
dearth of field studies into the long term impacts of fear appeals
across most domains [183]. This means that we do not have enough
evidence, just now, to come to an evidence-based conclusion about
the harm that could be caused by use, or overuse, of this behavioral
intervention in the cyber security domain.
The general approach taken by utilitarian theorists [116] is to
assess whether the benefits of an action outweigh the costs. This
is especially true in the United States where research is often con-
ducted under the philosophical umbrella of utilitarian ethics [59].
Based on this approach, as long as the benefit derived from a fear ap-
peal is greater than the costs, then the use of fear appeals is ethical.
This benefit does not need to be with the target of the fear appeal.
Instead, it is the net benefit to society as a whole with consideration
given to any associated costs, whether to the target of the fear ap-
peal or another entity, such as those that may become complacent
in performing the desired behavior if they are not the target of the
fear appeal. This net benefit may be positive in some circumstances.
However, as we just noted it is not always possible to make this
assessment since the benefits that are derived from fear appeals is
not entirely clear, with contradictory evidence abounding.
For example, a fear appeal could be designed with the goal of
reducing the spread of ransomware. The target of the fear appeal
might be Windows users. Some of the recipients of the fear appeal
may become upset at the prospect of losing all of their information
and, instead of performing a recommended action, they instead
choose to do nothing. They may even experience a certain level of
psychological harm. Likewise, Apple users may see the targeted
fear appeal and become complacent, thinking that since they were
not the target of the fear appeal they must be invulnerable. This
complacency may result in some Apple users having their devices
infected by ransomware, along with the Windows users who de-
cided against performing the recommended action. Likewise, some
individuals may become upset and experience a certain level of
psychological harm from being targeted by the fear appeal.
While all of this would be unfortunate, so long as the fear appeal
campaign was beneficial to society as a whole then it would be
considered ethical by deployers that use a utilitarian ethical frame-
work, despite the inherent imperfection. Thus, the failures would
not be discounted or otherwise ignored, but instead compared to
all of the benefits provided by the fear appeal. Ultimately, is the
overall decrease in successful ransomware attacks worth the cost
of designing and deploying the fear appeal, the possible increase
in ransomware attacks among some, as well as the possible psy-
chological harm inflicted on a few of those targeted by the fear
appeal?
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3.1.5 Threats Warranting Fear Appeals. There is very little notion
of the kinds of threats that warrant the use of fear-based interven-
tions [93]. So, for example, should we use fear to motivate people to
make backups, to use a VPN, or to encrypt their hard drives? What
about less widespread precautions, such as covering web cams or
eschewing Social Networking websites? At the moment, it seems
as if deployers arbitrarily decide that fear appeals are appropriate
and warranted in their context.
What is required is an objective way of judging whether or not
the use of fear is indicated, especially given the ethical concerns
mentioned in the previous section. Without some kind of criterion,
it is something of a free-for-all at the moment.
3.1.6 Noise. Any fear appeal experiment has to confront potential
confounds:
Fear Appeal Fatigue: Many domains deploy fear appeals and
the appeal enters a noisy environment to compete for attention.
People might suffer from “fear appeal fatigue” [20]. Simpson also
points out that there is evidence of growing resistance to some kinds
of fear appeals among the general public [157], perhaps evidence
of what MacCurdy [105] refers to as being afraid of being afraid.
Other Influences: It is difficult to isolate the impact of a fear
appeal used in a single study within a noisy environment. Consider
smoking, for example. Cigarette packets display fear appeals in
many countries, doctors generally confront people with the dangers
of smoking, and people are offered smoking cessation advice at
pharmacies. If a person is targeted by a new smoking-related fear
appeal and stops smoking, can we realistically attribute this purely
to the latest appeal?
Second-Order Effects: It is hard to know howwell experimental
findings that are based on individual responses to fear appeals will
transfer to widespread public campaigns, where the communication
is competing with a myriad number of other communications. In
particular, we do not know what will happen if and when people
start to discuss the topic [69]. Such dispersion of impact is hard to
measure or assess because it occurs dynamically and unpredictably
in the wild.
3.1.7 Recommended Action. There are a number of findings to
be considered that apply to the different kinds of recommended
actions.
Action Frequency: Tannenbaum et al. [165] report that fear
appeals worked better for one-off behaviors than for repeated be-
haviors. Success, however, is related to whether recipients embrace
the cause and adopt long-term behavioral changes. In cyber se-
curity, encrypting your mobile phone is a one-off behavior, and
making backups is a repeated and ongoing behavior. If a fear appeal
induces someone to make one backup, but not to do this regularly,
this is of limited use.
Action Type: Tannenbaum et al. [165] report that fear appeals
were more likely to prompt people to engage in detection behaviors
than in preventative behaviors. Floyd [50] reported that cessation
behaviors were more likely to be carried out in response to a fear
appeal than initiation of new behaviors. Hence all recommended
actions are not equal in this domain.
New or Pre-Existing Actions: Insko et al. [77] argue that if
the recommended action has to do with changing the way people
are currently acting, they are more likely to reject the message.
This could be because, as Ariely and Norton [6] argue, previous
behaviors create preferences. This might also be a manifestation
of the endowment effect related to pre-existing routines [144]. If
engaging with a particular security-related behavior has been a
negative experience, it becomes much harder for a future related
fear appeal to be efficacious [170].
Feasibility: Ruiter et al. [152] argue that the provision of specific
action instructions is essential, because, without this, fear appeals
are likely to fail to change behavior. Insko et al. [77] suggest that the
failure of many fear campaigns could be attributed to the fact that
the message does not provide the hearer with believable information
about how the fear can be assuaged. This is confirmed by a study
of actual fear appeals in Sweden [4].
3.2 Experiments
3.2.1 Acceptance. The recipient of a fear appeal might reject the
appeal because they believe that the consequence does not apply
to them, but only to others [15]. They might also reject the appeal
because accepting it would require them to change their beliefs,
mandate action that they are unwilling to take or because they
do not like the emotion the appeal is eliciting [164]. They may
also believe that the consequence has been exaggerated and that
the message source is not credible, or the claims unrealistic [104].
They might reject the import of the message if it is not believable
[67, 70, 92, 160].
If they do accept the message, they might deal with the negative
emotions triggered by fear appeals by engaging in fear control:
denying the reality of the threat, or the negativity of the conse-
quences [15, 153], as suggested by the EPPM. If they do engage in
danger control, they could also decide not to act because the rec-
ommended action itself seems abhorrent or unappealing [32, 158].
Leventhal and Watts [99] found that their participants chose not to
take the recommended action because it might detect a disease and
they dreaded the consequent treatment [115]. When acceptance
tests are used in experiments, they ought to explore reasons for
non-acceptance as well reasons for post-acceptance inaction.
3.2.2 Elicited Fear Levels. Fear appeals can be designed to elicit
low, moderate or high fear. What does the literature say about the
advisability of different levels?
In 1953, Janis and Feshbach published a seminal paper titled
“Effects of fear-arousing communications” [78]. They reported that:
“The over-all effectiveness of a persuasive communication will tend
to be reduced by the use of a strong fear appeal, if it evokes a high
degree of emotional tension without adequately satisfying the need
for reassurance” (p.92). Many papers cite this one to warn against
the use of fear appeals that will lead to high levels of fear [14, 24].
In warning against the use of high fear in fear appeals, researchers
explain that fear levels are inversely associated with persuasiveness
[24, 160], or backfire altogether by failing to induce behavioral
change [78]. Krisher et al. [90] also argue that strong fear appeals
can trigger maladaptive responses. Rhodes [145], on the other hand,
finds that eliciting moderate levels of fear worked better than either
low or high levels in their study related to driving speed.
Other researchers feel that a reluctance to elicit high fear in
fear appeals is misguided, and neutralizes the potential power of
a fear-based appeal. Hill et al. [68] ran a high-fear ‘stop smoking’
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campaign and reported that the campaign had a high impact, with
people taking steps towards ceasing smoking. Leventhal et al. [98]
discovered that a high fear condition motivated participants to form
strong intentions to act and Leventhal et al. [100] demonstrated
that both high and low fear appeals could lead to actual reductions
in smoking. Other studies also report on the efficaciousness of high
fear [46, 62] although these studies often measured attitude and
behavioral intention rather than actual behavior.
The advocates of high fear in appeals essentially consider fear
appeals to fit into a variance theory of human behavioral change
[37, 111]. The variance theory assumes that particular factors are
necessary and sufficient conditions for prompting a particular be-
havior, with greater magnitude of the triggering factor making the
outcome more likely.
It is worth mentioning that other researchers consider human
behavioral change something that can be modeled by a stage model
such as process theory [33]. For example, Cho and Salmon [26]
argue that people would be less receptive to fear appeals if they
were in a pre-contemplative state of mind, than if they were ready
to make a change. Cho [25] concludes that fear appeals are most
likely to fail in those who need them most, and that they are the
ones most likely to engage in fear control responses. De Hoog et
al. [37] cite [33] explain that the stage model approach considers
that people can be brought to a defensive state of mind, which
motivates them to act, as long as the actions themselves are deemed
to be efficacious. If this is so, greater attention to the feasibility of
the recommended action, both in terms of response efficacy [163]
and the individual’s self efficacy [153], and focusing on presenting
feasible solutions [108] is warranted when designing fear appeals,
rather than fixating on levels of fear to be elicited.
3.2.3 Delay Before Action. While people might indeed experience
fear immediately post-message, and intend to do something to
assuage it, this feeling might not endure. Janis and Feshbach [78]
argue that people might be more willing to act if such action is
immediately feasible. If there is a significant delay between the fear
appeal and the opportunity to act, the effect of the fear appeal might
wear off. Leventhal and Watts [99] found evidence that a delay
between the appeal and the opportunity to act made action less
likely. Leventhal [97] argues that a delay might play a role towards
triggering fear control actions. Leventhal and Watts explain that
positive emotions are far more enduring, and recommend focusing
on eliciting these rather than on triggering negative emotions such
as fear.
3.2.4 Measurement.
Different Outcomes: There is a wide variety of practice in this
area, some measuring attitude post-appeal [106, 156], attitude &
behavioral intention [145], attitude & behavior [84] or attitude, in-
tention & behavioral outcomes [32, 142]. With respect to behavior,
some rely on self report [89] while others measure actual behavioral
outcomes [142]. This makes it difficult to compare the efficacy of
fear appeals across different studies. It would be beneficial to have
a recommended experimental design protocol so that future studies
can be compared.
Measuring Fear: Themeasurement of fear in fear appeal studies
is variable and often considered inadequate [88]. As such, O’Keefe
[124] reports that fear appeals, in general, have not yet been proven
to induce high levels of fear. Yzer et al. [183] point out that most
studies of fear appeals rely on self report of positive vs. negative
affect [145]. This might not be the best way to measure fear in-
tensity or valence. Boster and Mongeau [18] reviewed a number
of fear appeal studies and discovered that authors generally did
not report the reliability of the fear measure instrument they used.
They also argue that the use of one-item measures of perceived fear
is insufficient.
Action Frequency: When it comes to a repeated and ongoing
recommended action, it is important to distinguish between an
initial first attempt and a long-term adoption of action when judg-
ing success. Sometimes studies report on success based on one
preventative action [7]. In these cases, measuring behavior once,
after the first attempt to act on the fear appeal has been taken,
could fail to detect a subsequent abandonment of the behavior or
a change in attitude [102] (This is likely, given the discussion in
Section 3.1.2). This makes it possible for experimenters erroneously
to conclude that their fear appeal has delivered the anticipated
positive behavioral outcome.
Behavior: In some domains, it is infeasible to measure actual
behavior. For example, one cannot monitor the actual use of con-
doms [2]. In the cyber security field, some behaviors are easy to
monitor, such as the installation of a password manager. However,
to conclude that an appeal has been successful, there ought to be
behavioral monitoring of long-term use of the password manager.
3.2.5 Operationalizing Findings. There is evidence that whether a
participant volunteers for a fear experiment, or not, is a strong mod-
erator of the extent to which there will be a correlation between
fear levels and resulting attitude [71–73]. Davis and Jansen [34]
found that a pre-existing sense of self efficacy, with respect to a
particular threat, had a positive effect on attitude towards adopting
recommended actions. It might be that volunteers are more capable
of mitigating a particular threat than those who do not volunteer,
and this would skew outcomes. On the other hand, ethics review
boards require researchers to gain informed consent from partici-
pants, which reflects willingness, if not direct volunteering. That
being so, it is not obvious how an experimenter could rigorously
determine how a seemingly efficacious fear appeal would impact
unwilling non-volunteers when rolled out to the general public.
Finally, because very few field tests of fear appeals have been
carried out [133, 183] we still do not know howwell lab- and survey-
based findings will apply in the wild.
3.3 Fear Appeal Behavioral Change Models
The models reviewed in Section 2.5 can be criticized in a number
of ways.
3.3.1 Starting Points: The models commence at the point where
the recipient is issued with the fear appeal. As such, they do not
consider a number of pre-existing potential confounds.
Prior Experience: It is unrealistic not to include the prior expe-
rience of dealing with the threat presented within the fear appeal
[97]. For example, Vaniea et al. [170] found that a negative expe-
rience of updating an operating system had an impact on future
security behaviors.
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Existing Practice: O’Keefe [126] used a public communication
to persuade people to stop smoking. He reports that the message
was accepted by non-smokers but not by smokers, the intended
targets.
This suggests that pre-existing practices, and presumably prior
decisions to smoke or refrain from smoking, led people either to
accept or reject the message. Leventhal [97] review a number of
studies showing that vulnerable people (e.g., smokers) were less
amenable to fear appeals than invulnerable people [80, 85, 99].
Pre-Existing Knowledge: The models also do not incorporate
differences in participants’ knowledge. The EPPM model does in-
clude individual differences but these seem to feed only into a
decision not to respond. Individual differences could also feed into
people taking action. For example, one of the authors of this paper
routinely covers their PC’s webcam — no fear appeal was required;
the decision was made based purely on their personal cyber security
value system, an influential factor suggested by [152].
Pre-Existing Emotional State: The models do not consider pre-
existing emotional state, which is indeed influential [56, 80]. If a
person is generally an anxious person, a fear appeal could trigger
a fear control response, not because they lack self efficacy, but
because of their existing emotional state.
3.3.2 Triggering Other Emotions. Halkjelsvik and Rise [60] com-
bined fear and disgust in fear appeals, but did not observe any
greater efficacy of appeals. Lewis et al. [103] suggest that, instead
of fear, more positive emotional appeals ought to be considered.
3.3.3 Opportunity: Figure 1 incorporates a seventh and final step
towards action: that the person has the opportunity to take the
recommended action. This is not realistically incorporated into
the models [166]. In HIV prevention fear appeals, opportunity is
related to availability of condoms [2]. In cyber security, the best way
to prevent dragnet surveillance is by using a VPN. The recipient
of a snooping-related fear appeal could know this, know exactly
how to use a VPN, but not do so. They might not be able to afford
the software, or their device might not have enough memory to
accommodate the app, or they may live in a country where the use
of a VPN is not permitted or considered a revolutionary act.
3.3.4 Feedback: Many of the models fail to include a feedback
mechanism. EPPM does include feedback [178] but this seems to
feed into fear and not danger control, which is where it is needed to
reinforce behavior [52]. In the cyber security domain, it is essential
that people are able to judge the response efficacy of the action
they take, so that they are motivated to continue the behavior.
3.3.5 Longitudinal Impact: The fear appeal models reviewed in
Section 2.5 do not incorporate any notion of realistic long-term
measurement, or delay before measurement. The two fear appeal
examples mentioned in the introduction seemed efficacious when
first evaluated (straight after the appeal) but a retrospective analysis
revealed the actual negative outcomes. Hastings et al. [63] found
that recent studies into the use of fear appeals are reporting much
smaller effects than those previously published. This could be be-
cause many older studies judged efficacy by measuring intention
immediately after message receipt, which is unrealistic in terms of
measuring genuine efficacy [102]. Terblanche-Smit and Terblanche
[167] found that the long-term efficacy of fear appeals depended
on the level of fear, something that was only detected because they
measured impact after a delay. The models ideally ought to show
that long-term outcomes of a threat requiring repeated behaviors
are the real tests of the efficacy of a fear appeal, not the immediate
self-reported post-appeal attitudinal, intention-based or one-off
behavioral response.
3.3.6 Social Aspects: Bandura [9] mentions a number of key com-
ponents of fear appeals. One of these is the social support required
to support change. The impact of social norms is included in many
technology adoption models [75]. It is possible that technology
adoption and precautionary action adoption share this feature. Hill
et al. [68] also mention that some recommended behaviors require
long-term support and resources to sustain. It is likely that so-
cial support is particularly important when it comes to enduring
behavioral change.
3.4 Summary
This section has sought to highlight the areas where researchers
diverge in terms of good practice related to deciding whether and
how to use a fear appeal (Section 3.1), how to experiment with fear
appeals (Section 3.2), and also points out problems related to the
behavioral change models reviewed in Section 2.5 (Section 3.3). We
now consider the cyber security fear appeal domain.
4 CYBER SECURITY STUDIES
In this section, we will consider fear appeal studies in cyber security.
We first bring together the insights from the review to propose an
experiment protocol for fear appeals.
4.1 Fear Appeal Experiment Guidelines
Boster and Mongeau [18] argue that the differences in fear appeal
outcomes are due to methodological artifacts. Our review of the
studies of fear appeals in cyber security exhibits a wide variation
in experimental design. We probably need more studies carried out
before we can decide whether or not fear appeals are appropriate
for use in the cyber security domain.
The gold standard of scientific research is a randomized con-
trolled design where different interventions are delivered to groups
in which participants are randomly assigned. This makes it possible
to draw comparisons and prove impact [88]. It is also good practice
to always have a control group that does not receive any interven-
tion. By randomly allocating participants to different groups, the
role of fear in the intervention can be isolated.
4.1.1 Deciding to Deploy. Before deciding, we first have to give
due consideration to whether the particular threat warrants the
use of a fear appeal (Section 3.1.5), and whether there is sufficient
evidence from domains similar to cyber security to suggest that
they might be effective. The ethics of the intervention also have to
be considered very carefully before proceeding (Section 3.1.4).
4.1.2 Design. Boster and Mongeau [18] suggest a model for a fear
appeal experiment, which we have extended in Figure 2.
The fear appeal itself is constructed as recommended in Sec-
tion 2.1. We have extended this with the following measurement
recommendations:
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Figure 2: Experiment Model (Extended from [18])
Pre-Appealmeasure of: fear [18, 39], emotional state (including
anxiety) [18], pre-existing knowledge [123], attitude, behaviors &
experiences of dealing with threat [137], demographics [18] and
social support [9].
Post-Appeal measures of:
(1) perceived: (1) fear (Section 3.2.2 [38]), (2) self-efficacy, (3)
response efficacy, (4) severity and (5) individual susceptibility [137,
146]. Perceived severity should be measured on a scale from 0 to 10
and perceived susceptibility from 0% to 100% [177]. Measure other
emotions that could have been triggered by the appeal (Section
3.3.2);
(2) feasibility of recommended action(s) [18, 108, 163], which
includes measures of opportunity to carry it out (Section 3.3.3);
(3) danger control responses (attitude, intentions and immediate
behavior [35, 97]). Crossler et al. [31] argue that it is better to study
actual behaviors than to rely on self-report as gathered by surveys,
citing a number of studies to substantiate this claim [5, 107, 162, 174].
fear control responses (avoidance, denial, reactance, helplessness
and wishful thinking [147, 178]).
Post-Action: fear (to check whether it has been assuaged by
the action [38]), and social support [9] to see whether this factor
influences success.
Post-Delay: after a period of time: has the person continued
with the recommended behavior?
4.1.3 Measuring Fear: It is important to measure fear rigorously.
Yzer et al. points to emerging research by [85, 128] into more accu-
rate ways of measuring fear. However, Mewborn and Rogers [150]
found that self-reported levels of fear and physiological measures
of fear were correlated. This means that self-report measures might
be a reasonable way of measuring elicited fear in fear appeal stud-
ies [137], which would make in-the-wild fear appeal studies more
feasible.
4.1.4 Rigor: Boster and Mongeau [18] urge experimenters to use
multiple measures for each construct, to ensuremaximum reliability.
They provide some examples where, even for behavior, multiple
measures are possible.
4.1.5 Analysis. Peters et al. [132] explain that the analysis should
make it possible to report the effectiveness of the individual com-
ponents of fear appeals, not merely a single behavioral change
measure. Moreover, researchers ought to commence with lab stud-
ies to test their experimental design, and then proceed to field
tests to ensure the veracity of their intervention [183]. Effect sizes
should be reported for individual components of the message, and
the intervention overall [125].
Analysis should include manipulation checks, to test for con-
founding factors — credibility of the message (personal susceptibil-
ity, perceived severity), or whether other emotions, such as anger,
have been triggered by the communication [97].
4.2 Cyber Security Fear Appeal Studies
A sample of cyber security studies that use fear appeals is presented
in Table 4. (A few studies that did not employ a fear appeal, but
nonetheless did measure the constructs from Protection Motivation
Theory, are presented for context.) The included studies are meant
to be representative rather than exhaustive of cyber security studies
that have employed fear appeals. Particular attention was given to
studies appearing in top tier journals or conferences, those that have
been cited multiple times, and/or those that represent a different
perspective when compared to the other included studies. There
are several observations worth noting.
4.2.1 Lack of Pre-Testing. The sample suggests that it is rare for a
fear appeal study to measure attitude, behavior, or existing levels of
fear (or other affect attributes) prior to the appeal being delivered.
While control groups have been implemented on a regular basis and
can assess thesemeasureswithout the effect of a treatment, this does
not provide the same level of confidence in treatment effects that a
pre-test yields [22]. As a more extreme example, one approach may
include a treatment group with a pre-test, one without a pre-test,
and a control group to match each of these treatment groups (e.g.,
[13]). However, experimental designs that incorporate increasingly
rigorous methods to control for various factors pose their own
set of challenges, such as acquiring a large enough sample size to
provide sufficient statistical power [28, 139]. The presence of such
challenges, as significant as they may be, do not assuage the need
for greater consideration to be given to such approaches.
4.2.2 Fear is Rarely Measured. More than half of the studies do
not measure fear. While a fear appeal presumably elicits fear, this
assumption is not supported by empirical evidence in a majority
of cases and some evidence suggests it does not [175]. Similarly,
other types of affect are measured even less often. When a fear
appeal is used, it may elicit fear, but it may also elicit other affective
states, such as anxiety or hostility [179]. To the extent that fear
appeals do increase fear, this may not be occurring in isolation;
other affective states may also be increasing or decreasing in their
respective levels. Having a priori information on an individual’s
affect unrelated to the fear appeal (i.e., incidental affect), may help
researchers better estimate the extent to which the appeal itself
contributed to a specific affective state (i.e., integral affect) [55, 172].
From a measurement standpoint, this does pose some challenges
since instruments used to measure affect’s lower order dimensions
can consist of up to 60 items [65, 176]. Perhaps this is another reason
(in addition to those that we will discuss shortly) to consider greater
deployment of longitudinal studies when using fear appeals.
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4.2.3 Recommended Action Procedures are Lacking. Most studies
did provide detailed information on the recommended action to be
taken to address the threat conveyed via the fear appeal. However,
several of the studies did not provide specific guidance on how to
effectively carry out the recommended action, such as the specific
procedures involved. Watching a video demonstration of how to
perform a specific task may provide users with something akin to
a vicarious experience and result in higher levels of self-efficacy
[8]. Engaging users in actually performing the task would likely
have an even stronger effect on self-efficacy through performance
accomplishments [8]. Likewise, there is a general lack of assessment
on whether participants believe the recommended action is even
feasible. They may believe they can perform the recommended
action (i.e., self-efficacy), and that the recommended action would
be effective (i.e., response efficacy), but it does not mean they believe
the recommended action is actually feasible in their individual
context [95, 97, 178].
4.2.4 Fear Control is Rarely Assessed. Many of the reviewed stud-
ies measure danger control via behavior (observed or self-reported),
behavioral intention, or attitude. However, fewmeasure fear control
via maladaptive rewards or costs. This may be due to the dominant
role Protection Motivation Theory has had in the fear appeal litera-
ture since its original formulation and the focus on danger rather
than fear control mechanisms [97, 149, 178]. As two separate pro-
cesses [97], a fear appeal could presumably trigger varying levels
of a danger and fear control processes. Thus, beyond whether or
not a danger control process has been successfully initiated as a
result of the fear appeal, it should be of equal interest to determine
whether a fear control process has been triggered.
4.2.5 Longitudinal Studies are Needed but Lacking. The majority
of the studies occur as a snapshot in time for the participants.
They are presented with a fear appeal and then asked to answer
some questions and/or their behavior observed. The goal of a fear
appeal is to have individuals change their behavior by adopting a
recommended action as part of a long-term danger control process.
There is no way to know if the fear appeal was successful, unless
this adoption is assessed at some later point in time by checking
whether the behavior is still occurring. Does adoption actually
occur if the desired behavior fails to persist beyond the study? A
one-week period seems to be a good starting point for determining
whether some level of adoption has been reached after the initial
fear appeal (e.g., [3]).
4.2.6 Triangulation. Triangulation is generally not used in fear
appeal studies, including in the assessment of affective states (e.g.,
fear), or the target behavior itself. For example, physiological mea-
sures could be used more to confirm self-reports of affective states.
While some research has used such measures (e.g., [128, 175]), there
has been a general shift away from the physiological aspects of
fear and other affective components [154]. Likewise, the studies we
reviewed generally detected a positive effect of the fear appeals,
but they mostly focused on behavioral intention, and detected these
via surveys. When they did record behavior, they generally used
self-report, which is only a proxy for actual behavior.
5 REPRISE
This review of fear appeals, both in cyber and in other domains,
serves to highlight the complexity of this intervention. There is
indeed evidence that fear appeals have been successful, but the
arguments against their use, and the wide variety of experimental
designs and evaluations, make it very difficult to have confidence
that they will prove efficacious in encouraging long-term secure
behaviors.
5.1 Fear Appeal Context
Table 3 provides examples of contexts within which fear appeals
could be used in cyber security, classified in terms of action type
(do, don’t, beware) from Table 2, and information security’s CIA
(confidentiality, integrity, and availability) principles. The final row
in the table names a consequence that could be used to elicit fear in
the fear appeal recipient: something that they probably wouldn’t
want to happen to them.
Information Security Principles
Confidentiality Integrity Availability
Don’t Use Default
Passwords
Use Public WiFi Share Passwords
Do Encrypt Patch Software Make Backups
Beware App Permissions Clicking on Links
in Emails
Share Devices
Undes-
irable
Conseq-
uence
Identity Theft Misinformed
Decisions
Loss of
Productivity
Table 3: Context of Fear Appeal Usage
This table contains the kinds of advice that could be provided as a
recommended actionwithin a fear appeal. The fear could be induced
by pointing out that the confidentiality, integrity or availability of
information could be compromised, and going deeper into how a
malicious person could violate this property.
Yet this table is essentially context-independent in terms of the
fear appeal recipient. It does not acknowledge that the recipient
of the fear appeal is an emotional human being. It is likely that
he or she receives the cyber security fear appeal in addition to a
number of other fear appeals they are being targeted by. The table
also does not account for the personal life experiences, access to
informal technical support in performing desired behaviors [136],
personality differences and mental health states of the recipients.
All of these will impact their response to the fear appeal.
Another context consideration is how new or old the desired
behavior is to the individual, as well as what the deployer of the
fear appeal is asking of that individual. Is the individual being
asked to perform a behavior one time, for a specific duration, or
is a permanent change being sought? These considerations are
advocated by Fogg and Hreha [51] but their behavior grid also
incorporates other aspects, such as the familiarity of the behavior
to the individual. Once the target behaviors have been classified
using their behavior grid, a Behavior Wizard is employed to fix
on the best behavioral change technique to deploy. In deploying a
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fear appeal, these are important considerations because the results
of such an analysis may vary considerably from one individual to
another.
If cyber security researchers want to experiment with, and de-
ploy, fear appeals, we have to be sensitive to individual differences,
and mindful of the damage fear appeals could unwittingly wreak on
those who are vulnerable or less able to act to assuage the fear. That
this is going to be challenging is obvious. If we want to make use
of fear appeals in cyber security, we cannot afford to ignore these
realities, which have to be acknowledged in fear appeal design and
experimentation.
5.2 Wider use of Fear Appeals
Fear appeals have been studied extensively through laboratory
experimentation, understandably so. These types of experiments,
after all, do provide the most robust method to determine the extent
to which fear appeals may effectuate change, if any. However, as
discussed in this paper, greater rigor is needed in designing cyber
security fear appeal experiments.
Nonetheless, there is reason to believe that such experimentation
is inadequate to fully understand and embrace how cyber security
fear appeals are used in the wild, even when such experimentation
does have significant rigor. Yet there are opportunities for more
ecologically-valid trials. Organizations have been using fear appeals
to induce behavioral change as it relates to cyber security policy
compliance. We should examine these natural experiments for clues
as to their efficacy in real-world settings. For example, several years
ago the United States government was disseminating a variety of
cyber doom scenarios [95]. While this effort was not proven to be
successful, and the organization here is arguably the United States
as a whole, it does point to some broader challenges.
For example, contrived experiments may lack the realism that
is required in security and privacy research [91]. A challenge with
realism is that it may raise even more ethical questions. As a con-
sequence, researchers may choose to advocate for greater internal
validity at the expense of external validity [91].
Field experiments (e.g., [17]) may help bridge this gap between
the controlled confines of a laboratory experiment and less well-
controlled organizational settings. While field experiments may
address some of the issues raised here, such as finding a better
balance between internal and external validity, they nonetheless
remain aimed at individual users. That being so, they cannot help us
to determine their effectiveness in creating desired change among
groups, which is sought in organizational settings.
Moreover, it will remain difficult to understand and consider the
many nuances of non-compliance within an organizational setting,
including both malicious and non-malicious insider behaviors [44].
Individuals may be non-compliant due either to mistakes (i.e., the
non-malicious insider) or other underlying nefarious motives (i.e.,
the malicious insider). Thus, the fear appeal may have been effective
in inducing fear and providing information on how to assuage that
fear, but that will not always be enough to combat non-compliance.
This would likely be observed more accurately in the wild via
natural experiments than either in the laboratory or during field
experiments.
Finally, we must also consider the long-term consequences of
using fear appeals, both for those being targeted and those that
are not. Consider a natural experiment that uses a fear appeal in
which a celebrity scares people into believing negative outcomes
associated with vaccinations are significantly disproportionate to
the actual risks involved [57]. The targeted group in this particular
example are those that have, or will have, children that would
typically be vaccinated. While the target group may experience
long-term consequences of not having their children vaccinated,
the children themselves may also suffer significant and sometimes
fatal consequences. Likewise, other adults and children may also
experience negative consequences, especially if they have not been
vaccinated or are immunocompromised.
Something similar may happen in cyber security due to the
deployment of a fear appeal. For example, if fear appeals were
used to convey the threat of fake anti-malware software and it
resulted in individuals being afraid to use legitimate anti-malware
software, they could end up having their computer infected, perhaps
losing all of their important files or personal photos. Likewise, other
computers and systemswill also be at risk, even if their owners were
not targeted by this fear appeal because infected computers place
us all at risk [5]. The point is that it is difficult fully to gauge the
long-term consequences of fear appeals, whether in cyber security
or elsewhere. What is known is that there are numerous unintended
consequences of fear appeals, both short and long term [27].
5.3 Other Approaches
Other approaches that engender behavioral change should continue
to be explored. This may include providing information on a rec-
ommended action without inducing fear. Given the lack of clarity
related to which components of a fear appeal (i.e., the fear trigger
or the recommended action) are the most effective in causing a
change in behavior [36, 37] and the limited number of instances
(e.g., [79, 109]) in which cyber security fear appeal studies have
examined recommended actions (apart from the fear component),
efforts should continue. This is especially true in light of evidence
that suggests that the recommended action, by itself, has been both
highly effective and more effective overall than presenting threat-
ening information to an individual [152]. Other alternatives to fear
appeals, such as those facilitated by Intervention Mapping [87], do
show some promise.
Another alternative, herd immunity, describes how the immu-
nity of a population or subset of that population works to prevent
a larger outbreak from occurring, which results in the larger popu-
lation being protected [47]. Some consideration should be given to
herd immunity in the cyber security context. It may mean that not
everyone needs to be compliant or engage in safe cyber security
and privacy behaviors [161]. However, this may also result in the
free rider problem that is seen in the public health sphere—some
individuals choosing not to be inoculated since their overall risk
has been reduced due to the immunity of the herd [40]. Thus, efforts
should continue in parallel between fear appeal approaches and
alternatives that use other mechanisms besides fear.
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5.4 Conclusion
We provide the guidelines in Section 4.1 to assist researchers tri-
alling fear appeals. Our hope is that subsequent studies will help
us to make a more clear-cut judgement about the utility of fear
appeals in the cyber security domain.
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